Notions of place and locale are ubiquitous in contemporary thought and writing. In the work of architects and artists, geographers and historians, sociologists and philosophers, feminists and environmentalists, topographical notions recur again and again, both as theoretical tools and descriptors. Yet, for all its ubiquity, seldom does one find any investigation of the concept of place itself, of what place is that distinguishes it from space, of how it stands in relation to time, of what the elements are that make up a place and what marks one place from another. What is often lacking is, one might say, a topography of place as such. Even a work such as Edward Casey’s *The Fate of Place*, while it offers an extremely detailed and valuable philosophical history of the concept, provides relatively little in the way of an elucidation of what place itself might be. For the most part, Doreen Massey’s comments about the use of the notion of space apply equally to place: ‘Many authors rely heavily on the terms “space”/“spatial”, and each assumes that their meaning is clear and uncontested. Yet in fact the meaning which different authors assume (and therefore — in the case of metaphorical usage — the import of the metaphor) varies greatly. Buried in these unacknowledged disagreements is a debate which never surfaces; and it never surfaces because everyone assumes we already know what these terms mean.’

There are a number of possible and perhaps obvious reasons for the lack of any close analysis of topographic notions. Place, one might suppose, is already a concept with which we are familiar and the ideas associated with it are readily grasped. And as its familiarity could be seen to derive from its common and everyday use, so too may that very ‘everydayness’ be taken to indicate that the concept can only remain a fairly loose and open-textured notion that will, in any case, resist any attempt at closer analysis. Yet if this is part of the reason why so little attention is given to understanding the nature of place, then it
would also seem to suggest real limits on the usefulness of place as a theoretical notion — although it may also suggest that many critiques of place are equally attacks on a target that can never be properly located. Another, and perhaps more significant, factor that may underlie the relative lack of attention given to the investigation of place, at least in some quarters, is a suspicion of the universalising tendencies that might be thought to accompany any such investigation. From this perspective what is important is recognition of and attentiveness to the particularities of different regions and places rather than any attempt to arrive at some over-arching concept of place as such. Such a unitary concept could only serve, so it might be supposed, to blind us to the more important differences that derive from race, gender, class and so forth. But trying to better understand what place itself might be need not blind us to difference — indeed it may help us to better understand the very nature of difference inasmuch as such difference may derive from the influence of place and locale. Moreover, arriving at some understanding of the structure of place — albeit a structure always instantiated in diverse ways — is also crucial if place is to have any theoretical significance at all. To reject the attempt to arrive at any sort of conceptual clarification in regard to place is effectively to reject its usefulness as a concept — moreover to reject all such clarification is to reject the very attempt to understand.

Lack of clarity about what place might be is not peculiar to contemporary discussion, but is indeed characteristic of much of the philosophical history of place within which place has often been only poorly distinguished from space. Indeed, place has most often been considered only within the context of an inquiry into nature and in a way that has typically resulted, especially in post-Cartesian thought, in the treatment of place as simply derivative of space. What then is place as such and what philosophical significance might it have? In the following pages I wish to sketch out an answer to this question — an answer that will traverse some of the ground covered in more detail by Casey’s work, but which will also look a little further afield. I would emphasise, however, that it will indeed be no more than a
sketch that is offered, since anything more would require more time and space, indeed, a different place, than is at my disposal here.  

II.

In a well-known passage, Michel Foucault identifies twentieth century thought as characterised by its preoccupation with space — a preoccupation from which, of course, he was not himself immune. Foucault writes: ‘The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development and of suspension, of crisis and cycle, themes of the ever-accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the world. The nineteenth century found its essential mythological resources in the second principle of thermodynamics. The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and that intersects with its own skein.’  

Here Foucault seems to treat the idea of the spatial as inclusive of the concept of place or locale that also seems such a widespread motif in contemporary discussion. That both spatial and topographic notions are indeed self-consciously deployed in much twentieth century thought, in a way that seems characteristic of this century, is not something with which I wish to take issue here. But Foucault’s comments are notable in that they seem to imply an indifference to the variety of notions that Foucault includes under the heading of the spatial — ‘simultaneity… juxtaposition… near and far… side-by-side… dispersed’. Similarly, Foucault appears simply to ignore the distinction between the notion of the purely spatial that is associated with ideas of pure simultaneity or extension and the concept of the topographic that is associated with place. Foucault is not alone in this — even Henri Lefebvre, who upbraids Foucault for his lack of attention to the problem of clarifying the spatial concepts he deploys, often seems just as oblivious to the differences at stake here.
Of course the lack of clear differentiation between spatial and topographic concepts in Foucault, Lefebvre and others is only a reflection of a widespread tendency to mix such notions together. We think of places as locations within space, of places as giving a space or ‘room’; we think in turn of space as defined by the places that are located within it and so on. Yet it is also evident that places are not mere points within a space. The existence of a homogenous and undifferentiated realm of extension is not sufficient to make for the existence of any place. For that we need more than just extension. And while a place may give room or space within it, the space we find within a place is quite different from the space that consists in nothing but a continuous and open expanse.

A crucial first step in making any move towards establishing the concept of place must be to distinguish it more clearly in relation to the idea of space. In fact if we look to the etymology of the English terms ‘place’ and ‘space’ we can see at least two quite different sets of ideas that are associated with these notions. On the one hand, the English ‘space’, like the French ‘l’espace’, derives from the Latin spatium, and before that from the Greek stadion, denoting a measure of length. ‘Place’, on the other hand, comes from the Latin platea meaning a ‘broad way’ or ‘open space’ which comes in turn from the Greek plateia, also meaning ‘broad way’ — the Greek term is in fact echoed in the name of the ‘broad-shouldered’ Plato. Other Latin based languages include terms referring to place that have a similar derivation, and are also closely related to the English ‘place’: in German, ‘Platz’, in French, ‘place’, and in Italian, ‘piazza’. One can see how the notion of a broad and open space remains an important element in these terms. Even the English word still carries something of this sense, clearer in its German, French and Italian counterparts, of an open but well-defined area — most often the square or marketplace within a town. In most languages the term for ‘place’ carries some connotation of such an open, bounded region and as such is clearly distinct from the concept of space as precisely the homogenous and extended realm, amenable to a purely mathematical understanding, within which such ‘places’ may themselves be situated.
Place and space are thus distinct, if related, notions, and are often recognised as such. Yet even where such recognition is explicit, it is also common to find that place is nevertheless regarded as a notion essentially subsidiary to the notion of space — where space is narrowly understood in terms of measurable and homogenous extension. Thus Einstein, in his Foreword to Jammer’s Concepts of Space, distinguishes place from space. He does so, however, in a manner that portrays place as merely a more primitive way of understanding something that is much better grasped through a concept of space — and specifically through a concept of space tied to extension and a certain form of containment. Einstein writes: ‘Now as to the concept of space, it seems that this was preceded by the psychologically simpler concept of place. Place is first of all a (small) portion of the earth’s surface identified by a name. The thing whose “place” is being specified is a “material object” or body. Simple analysis shows “place” also to be a group of material objects.’

This primitive notion of place gives rise, according to Einstein, to a conception of space that is tied to locality — a concept of place that is dependent on objects or groups of objects. The idea of place or locality is thus taken to be one way of understanding space, ‘space as positional quality of the world of material objects’, in contrast to another concept of space, which Einstein takes to be the ‘logically more daring concept’ (although a concept itself eventually superseded by more recent views), as ‘container of all material objects’. Jammer also seems to allude to a concept of place in his discussion of early concepts of space. Yet once again place seems to be treated as little more than a primitive way of understanding space: ‘To the primitive mind, “space” was merely an accidental set of concrete orientations, a more or less ordered multitude of local directions, each associated with certain emotional reminiscences. This primitive “space”, as experienced and unconsciously formed by the individual, may have been coordinated with a “space” common to the group, the family or the tribe.’

The emphasis, in Jammer and Einstein, on the concept of place as tied, first, to notions of locality and particularity, and, second, to certain qualitative associations or characteristics (albeit characteristics arising from ‘emotional reminiscence’), obviously picks
up on some important and central features of the concept. Such ideas contain hints of the
direction that must be taken by any attempt to investigate the notion of place more fully. Yet
neither Einstein nor Jammer give serious consideration to the possibility of a legitimate and
significant way of understanding place, or indeed space, that is other than as associated with
notions of physical extension or location. And both treat place as essentially a derivative and
secondary concept.

Of course, Einstein and Jammer might wish to bring to our attention here the fact
that their concern is with space and place as objective concepts of physical theory, and not,
they might say, with place as a subjective feature of our experience. Yet this is already to
presuppose a particular way of understanding place and reflects a more general tendency to
take space as paradigmatically a concept of physics, to treat place as secondary to it, and to
view any other concept of place or space as purely a psychological phenomenon. Thus even
ancient discussions of place, undertaken through investigations of the notions of chora and
topos, and medieval discussions of the same topic that centre on the concept of locus (the
derivation of the English ‘location’), are readily assimilated, as they are by Jammer, to the
history of the concept of space, narrowly understood as a concept of natural philosophy or
physics, rather than seen as part of any ‘history’ of place or space in a broader sense. There is
a real question, however, whether the primary sense of space or of place is that to be found in
the particular instantiation of these concepts within physical theory or, indeed, whether the
only other framework within which they may be approached is that of the ‘psychological’.
Certainly for thinkers near to the beginning of Western philosophy, thinkers such a Plato and
Aristotle in particular, spatial and topographic notions were neither wholly distinct from one
another nor did the idea of space as simply measurable extension provide the primary
framework within which such notions were understood. Significantly, however, one can
discern, even in Plato and Aristotle, the possibility of a contrast between different notions of
space and place and indications of how a notion of space as pure extension might develop.

In the Physics, Aristotle takes up the notion of topos as a concept central to
metaphysical inquiry. After criticising a number of alternative accounts of the nature of the concept (as form, matter and extension), he arrives at his own characterisation of the notion as ‘the first unchangeable limit of that which surrounds’. The ‘place’ or topos of a thing is thus understood to be the inner surface of the body within which that thing is enclosed so that the ‘place’ of a rosebud contained within a glass paperweight is the inner surface of the glass that surrounds the rosebud. The implication is that to be in place is always to be contained within an enclosing body and Aristotle states this explicitly: ‘a body is in place’ he says ‘if, and only if, there is a body outside it which surrounds it’.

However peculiar Aristotle’s emphasis on the idea of place, or topos, as a surface — the inner surface of an enclosing body — may seem, it is easy enough to understand why this might be an attractive notion. Aristotle’s interest is in being able to use the notion of place to explain that fundamental kind of change that is locomotion or change of place. His interest, then, would seem primarily to lie in the concept of topos as location. Rejecting the notion of void, and so accepting that every body must be enclosed within some other body, it seems that an obvious way to define a particular body’s location is by reference to the body that encloses it. So the location of any particular body is dependent on the next closest body that encloses it — the boundary between the two bodies thereby limiting both the enclosing body and the body enclosed while also defining the place of the latter (the place of the former being dependent on yet another enclosing body). As Henry Mendell points out, this Aristotelian conception of place has a respectable pedigree. It is a view adumbrated in a passage in Plato’s Parmenides and also in Gorgias’ On Not Being.

Yet even in ancient times the Aristotelian view of space or place as the inner surface of an enclosing body was not the only extant view on the matter. An alternative, which Aristotle seems himself to have held at one time, was to understand space or place as more or less equivalent to the volume or dimension of the thing enclosed. Thus, to use the example briefly referred to before, on such an account the place of the rosebud within the paperweight would be co-extensive with the rosebud itself, and not with the inner limit of the glass that
encloses it.

This view of space/place as dimensionality is one that appears explicitly in Plato, in a famous, but difficult discussion in the Timaeus. The topic at issue there is the manner in which things come into being and in which one thing can change into something else. This process of becoming requires, according to Plato, three elements: “that which becomes; that in which it becomes; and the model in whose likeness that which becomes is born.” That which becomes Plato compares with a child; that which is the model for that which becomes he likens to a father; and that in which becoming takes place — into which it is received — he compares to a mother. This ‘mother’ of becoming, which Plato also refers to as the Receptacle or nurse of becoming, is the place in which the qualities of the thing that comes into being appear. Since the Receptacle cannot contribute any quality to that which comes to be within it, so it cannot have any qualities of its own, and ‘must not be called earth or air or fire or water, nor any of their compounds or components’; but is instead of ‘a nature invisible and characterless, all-receiving, partaking in some very puzzling way of the intelligible and very hard to apprehend’. The Receptacle is, in fact, identical with space or place (the Greek term used by Plato is chora) which is 'everlasting; not admitting of destruction' and provides ‘a situation for all things that come into being'.

Aristotle refers specifically, in his Physics, to this ‘Platonic’ account of space or place, writing that: ‘if we regard the place as the interval of the magnitude, it is the matter. For this is different from the magnitude: it is what is contained and defined by the form, as by a bounding plane. Matter or the indeterminate is of this nature; when the boundary and attributes of a sphere are abstracted, nothing but the matter is left. This is why Plato in the Timaeus says matter and space are the same; for the “participant” [ie receptacle] and space are identical.’ The Receptacle is indeterminate, it has no qualities of its own, but is that space or place that receives qualities and so provides the necessary ‘room’ or space in which things can come to be. It is thus that the Platonic conception of space or place must be seen as quite distinct from that which Aristotle sets out in the Physics. Rather than being the inner
urface of a containing body, space/place is the extended and open realm within which a contained body is held or ‘received’.

Notwithstanding the differences between, what I will call for convenience, the ‘Platonic’ and ‘Aristotelian’ accounts of space or place (although the ‘Platonic’ account is also to be found in Aristotle’s Categories), both accounts seem to presuppose a connection between some notion of containment and the idea of space or place — on the Aristotelian account place is defined by reference to a containing body while on the Platonic account it is defined by reference to a body or quality that is contained. The idea of containment seems, in fact, to be central to any thinking about space and place and is crucial — especially as it gives rise to a notion of space as extension — to the historical development of those concepts.

There is another feature that is common to both the Aristotelian and Platonic accounts, but which disappears as the concepts of place and space develop further — namely, a view that ties place or space (and of course in the Platonic and Aristotelian context we cannot clearly separate these notions) to the things located within it. For Aristotle there can be no place or space without an enclosing body; for Plato the idea of space or place is understood always in relation to that which is received within it. This reflects, perhaps, the Greek tendency to understand place and space always in relation to particulars rather than in any more abstract way. It may also be seen to provide some support for Heidegger’s otherwise somewhat ambiguous claim (given the difficulty in establishing exactly how either place or ‘topos’ should be understood) that ‘The Greeks had no word for “space”... for they experienced the spatial on the basis not of extension but of place (τόπος).’22 One of the important shifts in the history of place and of space is the move towards a more abstract conceptualisation of these notions in ways that separates them from the particular things located in them, and, in the case of space, from particular locations.

Within the history of these conceptual shifts, the Platonic idea of space or place as tied to dimension, even though it emphasises the particular over the abstract, seems to stand in a more direct line of descent to modern ideas of space than does the Aristotelian
conception. It is this, presumably, that leads Max Jammer to claim that the ‘Platonic’ account of *topos* to be found in Aristotle’s *Categories*, of which Plato’s account in the *Timaeus* is a predecessor, is an account of ‘space’, while the later Aristotelian account in the *Physics* is an account of ‘place’.\(^{23}\) So while Heidegger can maintain that the Greek experience of space or place was properly on the basis of the ‘topographic’ — the located particular — he can nevertheless also hold that ‘the transformation of the barely apprehended essence of place (*topos*) and of *chora* into a “space” defined by extension was initiated by the Platonic philosophy, i.e. in the interpretation of being as *idea*.\(^{24}\) On Heidegger’s reading it is Plato who inaugurates the understanding of ‘space’ and of ‘place’ as measurable extension.

Yet, even without reference to Plato one can see how there is already, in the very idea of space or place as a matter of containment, a tendency towards a conception of space as extension. After briefly discussing the ‘psychologically simpler’ concept of place that is tied to the idea of the location of some object or set of objects, Einstein offers an alternative way of thinking about space. He writes: ‘Into a certain box we can place a definite number of grains of rice or of cherries, etc. It is here a question of a property of the material object “box”, which property must be considered “real” in the same sense as the box itself. One can call this property the “space” of the box. There may be other boxes which in this sense have an equally large “space”. This concept “space” thus achieves a meaning which is freed from any connection with a particular material object. In this way by a natural extension of “box space” one can arrive at the concept of an independent (absolute) space, unlimited in extent, in which all material objects are contained.’\(^{25}\) Here it is quite clear, not only the way in which the notion of space at issue arises out of a concept of containment, but also the way it enables an explicit move to a more abstract conception of space that will enable a further move to a concept of absolute space of the sort advanced, finally, by Newton. The move to a more abstract concept is something for which the ‘psychologically simpler’ notion of place seems rather less well adapted, since that notion is tied more directly to the particular. This is so even in Einstein’s characterisation of place, which treats place as just ‘position’, according to
which place is tied to a particular portion of the earth’s surface or to a particular object or

group of objects. Indeed, the development of an abstract concept of position or location seems
to itself depend on the idea of an independent or absolute space that arises out of the idea of
space as a containing region. Only within an extended and homogenous space is it possible to
treat locations as mere points that differ from one another only in so far as they are
represented by different coordinate values. Thus the idea of space as the region of
containment gives rise to the notion of space as a system of simple locations and in turn to a
transformed conception of place as mere location.

Einstein and Jammer both find elements of this modern concept of space in the work
of ancient thinkers. And I have already noted the way in which a concept of space or place as
extension is present in both Plato and Aristotle. But the idea that is central in enabling the
development of the modern concept is an idea found, not in Plato or Aristotle, but in the
atomists: the idea of void (kenon). It is this idea that John Philoponus, writing in the 6th
century, explicitly treats as identical with the concept of space. Thus he writes of ‘a space
[chôra] which according to its own definition [logos] is void, although it is always filled with
body’26 characterising it further as ‘a certain interval [distêma, spatium in the Latin
translation], measurable in three directions, different from the bodies which occupy it, and
incorporeal in its very nature. Place consists of the dimensions alone and is empty of every
body. In fact, vacuum [kenon] and place [topos] are essentially the same thing.’27

Although other ancient thinkers also took place or space to be equivalent to a notion
of quantifiable extension, Philoponus is unusual in his explicit treatment of space as identical
with void. Indeed, it was not until the Renaissance that this idea came into its own. Amongst
fifteenth and sixteenth century thinkers such as Gianfrancesco Pico and Giordano Bruno the
development of a new idea of space went hand in hand with a rethinking and, in many cases,
the rejection of the concepts of Aristotelian physics. Thus we find Pico writing of place as a
void. — in a manner Aristotle could not have countenanced, albeit a void that in fact is
always filled: ‘thus place is empty, empty (vacuum) assuredly of any body, but still never
existing as a vacuum alone of itself.'

This conception of void or vacuum reappears in Bruno who employs a notion of space as an infinite and empty realm in which all things are located: ‘There is a single general space,’ he writes, ‘a single vast immensity which we may freely call VOID...’

This new conception of space could be seen as enormously liberating: just as it offered the idea of a realm of unfettered and unlimited movement, so it could also be seen as expressive of a new and exciting sense of intellectual freedom.

The shift towards this conception of space as sheer extension, and the accompanying tendency for place to be subsumed under the concept of space, reaches a particularly developed form in Descartes for whom space and place are scarcely distinguishable concepts. In his Principles of Philosophy, in a passage in which he draws upon the scholastic distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ place (a contrast that can be understood in terms of the difference between the location of a body and the extension of that body), Descartes writes: ‘There is no real distinction between space [l’espace], or internal place [le lieu], and the corporeal substance contained in it; the only difference lies in the way in which we are accustomed to conceive of them. For in reality the extension in length, breadth and depth which constitutes a space is exactly the same as that which constitutes a body... The terms “place” and “space”, then, do not signify anything different from the body which is said to be in a place; they merely refer to its size, shape and position relative to other bodies... The difference between the terms “place” and “space” is that the former designates more explicitly the position, as opposed to the size or shape, while it is the size or shape that we are concentrating on when we talk of space. For we often say that one thing leaves a given place and another thing arrives there, even though the second thing is not strictly of the same size and shape; but in this case we do not say it occupies the same space. By contrast, when something alters its position, we always say the place is changed, despite the fact that the size and shape remain unaltered.”

Here one can clearly see how Descartes is able to deploy the notion of place, understood primarily in terms of the notion of containment, as the basis on which to develop a concept of space as extension. In the idea of containment is given, not
only the idea of that which bounds the body contained (‘outer place’), but also the idea of that open expanse which is established within those bounds (‘inner place’). Thus a pitcher containing water can be understood as holding the water it contains in a place that is defined by the inner surface of the pitcher itself, but the area enclosed by that containing surface can also be understood as constituting a ‘place’ or, perhaps better, a space. Place becomes merely the position of the contained body in relation to other bodies. Within this Cartesian account place and space are thus related concepts that refer to features of bodies — to their position and extension respectively — and within this account it is clearly space as extension that is the more significant notion.

The philosophical history of space and place is thus a history in which the concept of space as extension is steadily refined, but in the course of which refinement the idea of place as location is gradually lost or, at least, loses its theoretical significance. Part of the difficulty, then, that surrounds the use of place as a theoretical or philosophically significant concept in contemporary discussion is precisely that the notion has come to be subsumed under the concept of space as extension. This way of treating place as merely a variant of space results in the disappearance of much that is important about the notion of place as such. The idea of place as an open but bounded realm that has a character of its own is hard to give sense to on such an account. Places become interchangeable positions differentiated only by the objects that are located within them.

III.

In the history of philosophy we can thus chart a clear shift — a shift given a particularly detailed account in Edward Casey’s work — towards a separating out of concepts of space and place from a primary notion of location that both contains and grounds to a concept of space as measurable extension and of place as mere location specifiable within such a spatial framework. And even though modern cosmological physics no longer understands space in the terms developed by Descartes and Newton, still the idea of space as tied to physical
extension has not disappeared and, indeed, the Cartesian-Newtonian idea of space as ‘container of material objects’ remains perhaps the dominant conception of space within much everyday thought. Moreover, in the absence of any explicit examination of the concepts as such, the frequent deployment of spatial and topographic concepts in so much contemporary theory — whether in discussions of globalisation, ecological regionalism or whatever — really amounts just to the deployment of the Cartesian;Newtonian conception of space as physical extension and, derivative from that, of place as simple location.

Indeed, even the attempt to rehabilitate a concept of place by treating it as a specifically human appropriation of physical space — a tendency that can be discerned within much recent writing especially in environmentalism, but also in geographical and sociological theory — remains within the very same framework that was evident in Einstein and Jammer’s treatment of space and place. So place is treated, even if only implicitly, as derivative of space or else, if the attempt is made to rehabilitate the concept as involving more than just this, it is so only to the extent that place incorporates some subjective, emotional or affective component. And this latter approach merely conjoins the idea of a part of objective physical space with the notion of some subjective emotional or affective quality or set of qualities, and so continues to treat place as derivative of these more basic ideas and provides no explication of place as a concept in its own right. On such an approach, the connection between any particular space and the emotional qualities associated with it could turn out to be completely contingent and there is no reason to suppose that it is the experience of specifically **topographic** or even **spatial** qualities that are actually at issue in such an experience of place.\(^{32}\)

The association of some set of felt qualities with a particular space need be no more than a result of the triggering of certain responses — perhaps in a completely accidental fashion — by some combination of physical (and, for this reason alone, spatially located) features in the immediate environment. Consequently, it is not place as such that is important here, but just the idea of emotional responsiveness — a responsiveness that need not itself be grounded in any concept of place or locality at all.
It is notable that this way of approaching the question of place seems to be at least implicit even in the work of many writers who seek explicitly to direct attention to place as a significant theoretical notion. Thus Yi-Fu Tuan, an important and pioneering figure within environmentalist discussions of place who is otherwise remarkably sensitive to many of the issues at stake, often tends to treat place in a way that is suggestive of the concept as a purely subjectivist construct. Thus much of Tuan’s work is explicitly written from ‘The perspective of experience’ as the subtitle of his *Space and Place* has it and experience is characterised by Tuan as ‘a cover-all term for the various modes through which a person knows or constructs a reality.’ Elsewhere he characterises his overall project in terms of the study of ‘environmental perception, attitudes, and values.’ There is a certain equivocation in Tuan’s work, common in much writing on place, between place or space as that which gives rise to experience on the one hand and space or place as experiential construct on the other. And this equivocation is indicative of the some of the obscurity that seems to attend on the concept of place almost wherever it appears. Such equivocation aside, however, it does seem that Tuan tends towards an account of place in terms of the subjective human response to environment and so towards an account quite consistent, indeed continuous, with the approach already encountered in Jammer and Einstein.

Of course, since human responses to the environment are many and varied and since the environment has a role to play in almost all of experience, so too is the account of place similarly dispersed. This is so not just in Tuan’s work — although it is perhaps a particular feature of those discussions that identify themselves as concerned with a ‘humanistic’ approach to the issues — but in the discussion of space and place throughout much of the literature irrespective of field. The proliferation of material in relation to place leads J. Nicholas Entrikin to refer to the ‘sometimes competing, and occasionally confusing, claims that have been made and continue to be made about the study of place and region’ and he adds that ‘One of the reasons for this confusion may be that it is beyond our intellectual reach to attain a theoretical understanding of place and region that covers the range of phenomena
to which these concepts refer.’ The dispersed character of so many accounts of place across so many disciplines, so many different writers and with respect to such a variety of material and theme, provides both an impetus towards the attempt to develop some more integrated approach to place, while also, as Entrikin’s warning makes clear, making any such attempt quite problematic. Yet if place is indeed to be taken up as a concept in its own right, rather than as a convenient catch-all for what otherwise appears to be only a loosely connected set of ideas and problems, then the development of some more integrated account is indeed essential. Only within the framework of such an account would it be possible to give any content to the idea that the set of problems and ideas to be found in discussions of place are indeed significantly related.

The appearance of place as a central, if problematic, concept is clearest in discussions that touch on aspects of human existence and experience. In this respect the emphasis on place as experiential or as tied to the human response to the environment, while it actually curtails the possibility of giving an adequate account of place as such, is nevertheless instructive. It is not, however, that the crucial point about the connection between place and experience is that place is something only encountered ‘in’ experience, rather it is that place is integral to the very structure and possibility of experience. Such a way of thinking about place appears, though, as Edward Casey suggests, in a somewhat ‘indirect’ fashion, in the work of Martin Heidegger.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger treats human beings, or more properly *Dasein*, as essentially characterised in terms of their ‘being-in’ the world. This leads Heidegger to distinguish the sense of ‘being-in’ that is proper to human being from the ‘being-in’ that is associated with the sense of physical containment that is part of the modern conception of space identified by Einstein and Jammer and which Heidegger himself characterises as ‘Cartesian’. Failure to make such a distinction would, it seems, commit Heidegger to understanding the relation between the world and *Dasein* as essentially no different from the relation between, for instance, a matchbox and the matches contained within it. It would also
seem to entail a view of *Dasein* as existing in a way essentially no different from the way in which matchbox, matches or any other physical objects exist. Such a view Heidegger rejects as inadequate to any proper understanding of *Dasein* as such. It is inadequate, on Heidegger’s account, because it makes problematic the very possibility of a relation between *Dasein* and its world (or the things within that world) — that this is indeed so is clearly evident, according to Heidegger, in the rise of relativistic and sceptical modes of thought.

In this latter respect the ‘objectivism’ Heidegger associates with the Cartesian view of spatiality is seen as necessarily tied to ‘subjectivism’ — and this would seem, in fact, to mirror the connection we already seen to obtain between the view of space as primarily a feature of the physical universe and of place, or ‘meaningful space’, as a human, and therefore subjective, construct. In distinguishing the spatiality of *Dasein* from the spatiality of objects, Heidegger thus asserts the impossibility of any purely ‘objective’ treatment of *Dasein* that would treat *Dasein* as no more than an object among other objects while also rejecting any ‘subjectivist’ understanding of *Dasein* in its relation to the world. Indeed, given the idea that *Dasein* is properly understood as already inclusive of the world, one can see how Heidegger could later comment that: ‘*Dasein* names that which should first be experienced, and then properly thought of, as Place [Ort]’.41

Heidegger provides an important example of the way in which the concept of place may be seen as significant in the understanding of human being and so of human thought and experience. Indeed, something like the Heideggerian thinking of *Dasein* as place is what motivates my own inquiries here. So far as the idea of experience is concerned (the idea central to the work of writers such as Tuan), it seems that understanding the structure and possibility of experience — in particular the sort of experience that is exemplified in the human — is inseparable from an understanding and appreciation of the concept of place. And understanding this is more than a matter of grasping the idea of mere spatio-temporal location. Such location is part of the concept of place, but it does not exhaust that concept. Indeed, as employed here and as already suggested by the inquiry into the etymology of the
term, the idea of place is the idea of an open and yet bounded realm that has a character of its own — a character that can sometimes be expressed in the giving of a name to such a place — and that is structured in terms of the interconnection between the elements that are found within it. Moreover, as in Heidegger, such a realm is not constituted as a purely ‘objective’ structure. In other words, it is not a structure that can be understood in terms simply of a system of interchangeable locations associated with objects. Neither, however, is it purely ‘subjective,’ since the sort of realm at issue here is not dependent on the existence of subjects, but is rather a structure within and with respect to which subjectivity is itself established. Place is not founded on subjectivity but that on which the notion of subjectivity is founded. Thus one does not first have a subject who apprehends certain features of the world in terms of the idea of place; instead the structure of subjectivity is given in and through the structure of place.

Understanding human being in the world, with all its associated structures, is thus a matter of coming to understand a form of being-in, and so a form of spatiality, that is other than that associated with space as measurable extension. And although this point is brought out in a particularly important (although problematic) fashion in Heidegger’s work, we do not need to look to Heidegger alone in order to see the way in which the problem of understanding human being, and more particularly, of understanding concepts such as knowledge, self, experience and so forth, is inseparable from the problem of understanding the possibility and nature of place. Human being is precisely a form of ‘being-in’ that involves oriented, bounded location. To attempt to understand human being using only the resources given through an objective and ‘levelled-out’ understanding of space as extension is to fail to understand the nature of the being at issue. No purely objective space can ever be sufficient to enable the development of the concept of the sort of place that is part of the structure of human being since such an objective space contains no topography of the sort required. If we tend to forget this it is only because we think of objective space always from a point of view that treats it from a perspective that is itself placed.
That the problem of place has a philosophical significance that goes beyond mere questions of spatiality alone is evident from consideration of a number of problems within contemporary philosophy. In fact the rise of notions of place and space in twentieth century thought, something Foucault and others have noted, is itself merely indicative of the centrality of these questions to the philosophical inquiry into the human. Most often such questions have arisen in areas of ethics, particularly environmental ethics, in political discussion, and in considerations of identity. But the problem of place names a quite ubiquitous issue that can also be seen in contemporary philosophical discussions within even the so-called ‘analytic’ tradition of — the discussion of the nature of mental content provides a good example of this. While externalist theories of content — theories that take the content of a thought to be determined by objects and events in the world external to the body of the thinker — can be seen to fit with an emphasis on spatiality and locality, such theories face a problem in determining just which features of an individual’s environment should be taken to be the relevant external determinants of a particular creature’s mental states. Only if we have a conception of the space in which a creature is embedded as having a certain topography that marks particular features as salient can we make any externalist view of content plausible. This is merely an illustration of one way in which a concept of place might be seen to be indispensable to any inquiry into the nature of thought or agency. Indeed, there is reason to think that only if we can understand creatures as embedded in a world can we understand them as in any way capable of thought — whether believing, desiring, hoping, calculating, fearing, meaning or whatever — or indeed of purposive action. Only a creature that is oriented and located can relate to objects and to the world. Consequently, the unavailability of a notion of spatiality other than that of measurable extension, and the relegation of place, if recognised at all, to the status of a subjective or experiential concept can only make the inquiry into thought and agency problematic and obscure. The problem of place is not a marginal problem concerning merely the way in which spatiality alone is to be understood, but is fundamental to epistemological, anthropological and psychological inquiry — even,
indeed, to problems of ethics and politics. For in all these instances what must be articulated
is the structure of a particular region that is not the structure of an extended, measurable
domain, but rather the structure of an open space of activity that is also bounded, focused and
oriented — the structure of place. 33

IV.

If we take the turn to place seriously, then what emerges is the possibility of thinking of
subjectivity — and of thought and experience — as essentially a function of place or locale.
Thus we should not think of the relation between human beings and their world as a relation
in which human beings impose meaning onto an otherwise ‘objective’, physical structure.
Understanding the possibility of human being — or meaning — is just a matter of
understanding how place as such is possible. Understanding human being and understanding
place are one and the same. Yet it is not just that human subjectivity is tied to the structure of
place. The manner in which places are themselves structured, and the way in which that
structure constrains the investigation and delineation of places, provides an important model
for the inquiry into subjectivity.

The concept of place is characteristically the concept of an open region, in which
things reside and in which relations between things can be established. The idea of place as it
operates in talk of a ‘place’ or ‘square’ within a town provides a neat example of this. But
such a place is itself constituted through the inter-relation of the elements within it. The town
square thus provides a bounded, oriented ‘space’ within which the affairs of the town are
brought into focus, in which particular buildings and activities take on a certain character and
identity, in which individual persons are able to take on the role of citizens; but the character
of the place is itself dependent on what is brought to focus within it. If we look to the larger
region of the town as a whole the character of the many particular places within the town is
similarly dependent on the inter-relation of places within the region as a whole and the same
is also true of entire landscapes. Thus, if one is to delineate the structure of a place or region,
then what is required is to exhibit the structure of the region as a whole as it is constituted through the interplay of the various elements within it. Indeed, this idea is neatly exemplified in the actual practice of map-mapping and particularly in the traditional techniques of the topographical surveyor.

Topographical surveying is, according to an old British Government textbook on the subject, ‘the science, artfully executed, of measuring the physical features of the earth and the art, scientifically controlled, of delineating them’. While the advent of aerial surveying and, more recently, satellite mapping techniques, have wrought great changes in the actual practice of surveying not only over the last one hundred years, but even the last forty, the basic principles for the surveyor on the ground have nevertheless remained much the same. In the centuries prior to the twentieth, surveyors relied principally on theodolite and chain, on a good eye and hand, and a strong pair of legs. For the surveyor equipped only with such basic equipment, then or now, and faced with a hitherto unmapped region, the task is to map out that region from within the region itself. Only by measurement of distance and angle, by repeated triangulation and traverse, can a picture of the topography of the region be built up. For such a surveyor there is nowhere outside of the region itself from which an accurate topographical picture can be obtained. It is thus precisely through the surveyor’s active involvement with the landscape that an accurate mapping is made. A purely topographical understanding of a landscape does not, furthermore, look to some deeper topography that underlies the topography made evident through our active engagement within it. There is no such ‘deeper’ topography to be found. The lie of the land is indeed given — almost literally — on its surface rather than being hidden beneath it.

If place is indeed taken to be a notion central to the understanding of human subjectivity, or to the possibility of thought, experience or action, then the structure of place itself, and the manner in which that structure is delineated, should perhaps also be a guide to the manner in which any inquiry into subjectivity ought also to proceed. In that case, it will not be a matter of reducing subjectivity to some more primitive substratum — of finding
something beneath the surface of the human — but rather of understanding how subjectivity
is structured through its being inter-related with other elements and through the inter-relation
of the elements within it. It will be a matter of coming to understand things through their
interconnection rather than their reduction, through recognition of their complexity rather
than their simplification. Such a mode of proceeding has a philosophical precedent, if only
implicitly, in Heidegger, but it also strongly reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Thus he writes of
his method of approach in the Philosophical Investigations that ‘The philosophical remarks in
this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course
of these long and involved journeyings. The same or almost the same points were always
being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. Very many of
these were badly drawn or uncharacteristic marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman.
And when they were rejected a number of tolerable ones were left, which now had to be
arranged and sometimes cut down, so that if you looked at them, you could get a picture of
the landscape’.45 If philosophy is indeed seen to be essentially preoccupied with place, then
perhaps the only approach adequate to the philosophical task will be one that is itself
thoroughly ‘topographical’.

V.

If we accept that the ubiquity of spatial and topographic concepts in contemporary thought is
not just a matter of intellectual fashion, but also reflects something more, then the obvious
answer is that the ubiquity of place reflects the central significance of place in any
understanding of human being and experience. Yet just what significance is to be attached to
place in this respect depends crucially on how place is understood. If we remain, even if only
implicitly, within the framework established by the Cartesian-Newtonian model of space and
place, then we are forced to accept a conception of place as either just a modification of
space — a ‘location’ within an extended spatial realm or a region within such a realm — or
as a modification of space to which attaches some ‘emotional reminiscence’ or feeling.
Perhaps such reminiscence or feeling might be considered an important aspect of human experience and perhaps it could be explained, within the parameters of such an account, by reference to biological or evolutionary considerations. Yet to adopt such an approach is effectively to strip place of any real significance in its own right while also creating serious difficulties for the attempt to arrive at an adequate understanding of human being or experience — treating place as a matter of subjective feeling does indeed assume an account of human being rather than provide one. Finding place is thus a matter of finding ourselves, and to find ourselves we need first to rethink the question of the nature and significance of place.

1 Casey, The Fate of Place (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). In his Getting Back into Place (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), Casey does attempt to more directly address questions concerning the significance and structure of place (see also the discussion of place in Casey’s Remembering [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989] and in some of the essays in his Spirit and Soul [Dallas: Spring Publications, 1991]), yet Casey’s approach in this earlier work, though valuable, remains much more phenomenological in its orientation than the sort of analysis that I propose here. For all that, Casey is one of the very few authors — and there are indeed only a handful if that — who have attempted to address the issue of place directly.

2 Doreen Massey, ‘Politics and Space/Time’, in Michael Keith and Steve Pile (eds.), Place and the Politics of Identity (London: Routledge, 1993), 141-2; see also Neil Smith and Cindi Katz, ‘Grounding Metaphor: Towards a spatialized politics’, in Keith and Pile, Place and the Politics of Identity, 67-83. Massey’s concerns are not merely with theoretical clarity or rigour; she also sees certain uses of the notions of space and spatiality as depriving those notions of any political content and this she views as problematic.

3 Of course, since my interest is in the concept of place as such, I will not be discussing the more specific uses to which concepts of space and place have been put in particular theoretical contexts or in the work of particular theorists. Moreover, as my investigation is primarily conceptual, so I will not be drawing on empirical studies that may be thought to shed light on the human relation to place. Indeed, in the absence of any clearer conceptualisation of what place might be, it must remain unclear just how to interpret any empirical evidence that might otherwise be thought to be relevant here.

4 I do, however, attempt to develop an answer to this question in much more detail in my Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 1999).

5 Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’, Diacritics 16 (1986), 22.


7 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 3-4.


9 Einstein, Foreword to Jammer, Concepts of Space, xiii.

11. Aristotle, *Physics IV*, 5, 212a20 (all translations are taken from Aristotle's *Physics Books III and IV*, trans. Edward Hussey [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983]). Elsewhere Aristotle presents the same idea in slightly different form. Place is “the limit of the surrounding body, at which it is in contact with that which is surrounded” (212a36).

12. See the development of this example in Henry Mendell, ‘Topoi on Topos: the Development of Aristotle’s Concept of Place’, *Phronesis* 32 (1987): 209-210. There are some difficulties with interpreting Aristotle’s concept of place in this way. In particular it gives rise to the difficulty how an object can be understood to remain stationary when it is situated within a flowing medium — as, for instance, a ship that is moored in a river with the current moving around it. This is a difficulty Aristotle himself addresses (see *Physics* 212a8-19) seeming to identify the place of the boat with the unmoving banks and bed of the river rather than the water that travels past them. For more discussion of this and other problems in Aristotle see Richard Sorabji, *Matter, Space and Motion* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 1988).

13. Consequently the world does not have a place, since “there is nothing besides the universe [to pan] and the sum of things, nothing which is outside the universe; and this is why everything is in the world [ouranos]. (For the world is (perhaps) the universe). The place [of changeable body] is not the world but a part of the world”, *Physics IV*, 212a31.


17. *Timaeus*, 50d.


20. *Timaeus*, 52b. Plato adds that space is “itself apprehended without the senses by a sort of bastard reasoning” (trans. Cornford). See also the discussion at 52d-53b of which the role of the Receptacle in separating out the various qualities with which it is filled through a process understood analogously to the winnowing of grain.

21. *Physics*, IV, 2.209b6-13. Here matter is being understood as pure mathematical extension, not as anything more than this — it is not, for instance, the material from which something is constituted (see Mendell, ‘Topoi on Topos: the Development of Aristotle’s Concept of Place’, 213 and 213-214n19). Although Plato does himself draw an analogy between the Receptacle and gold that may be moulded and remoulded into many different things (*Timaeus* 50a-50b), he also indicates that this analogy is to some extent misleading.


25. Albert Einstein, Foreword to Max Jammer, *Concepts of Space*, xiii. The modern conception of absolute space that Einstein discusses here is, of course, one that is ultimately abandoned by physics in favour of a relativistic conception. See Einstein’s brief comments on this in the Foreword to Jammer, xv and also his discussion in


29 Bruno, On the infinite universe and worlds, trans. Dorothea Waley Singer in Giordano Bruno (Schuman, New York, 1950), 363. Casey points out that for all that Bruno and others like him seem to have been so taken up by this conception of space, they also retained a conception of place as distinct from place. Only later does place seem to become completely subsumed under space as extension, see The Fate of Place, 123-124.

30 The distinction of internal from external place can be found originally in Duns Scotus. For Scotus place is a matter of the relation between containing and contained body. Internal place is that which is internal to the containing body while external place is that which is external to the contained body. For Scotus these are both notions of place rather than space and the Latin terms he uses are loci and ubi. See Duns Scoti, Doctoris Subtilitis, Ordinis Minorum, Quaestiones in librum IV Sententiarum, dist. X, quaest. II: Utrum idem corpus possit esse localiter simul in diversis locis? (VIII, 513); see also the discussion in Pierre Duhem, Medieval Cosmology, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 183. Scotus’ distinction may have its origins in Simplicius, although some form of the distinction between extension and location can be traced back to earlier sources such as Aristotle.


32 See, for instance, Yi-Fu Tuan, Topophilia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 113 — ‘The fact that images are taken from the environment does not, of course, mean that the environment has ‘determined’ them; nor...need we believe that certain environments have the irresistible power to excite topophilic feelings. Environment may not be the direct cause of topophilia but environment provides the sensory stimuli, which as perceived images lend shape to our joys and ideals.’

33 Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).

34 Tuan, Space and Place, 8.

35 Tuan, Topophilia, 245. In this work Tuan is quite explicit about the nature of his work as an essay in environment psychology. He also makes clear that he is well aware of the disparity in the materials and themes with which he is concerned and acknowledges that there no ‘single all-embracing concept’ that guides his work (see Tuan, Topophilia 2-3).
Tuan characterises his work as part of such an approach and lists a number of publications as evidence of ‘a growing interest in the study of “place” from a variety of humanist perspectives’ (Space and Place, 7 n.3).

J. Nicholas Entrikin, The Betweenness of Place (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1991), 14. Entrikin immediately goes on to suggest that ‘A more modest, but not insignificant, goal is a better understanding of the narrative-like qualities that give structure to our attempts to capture the peculiar connections between people and places.’ It is noteworthy that Entrikin explicitly takes up some of the issues relating to the conception of place as a purely mental or subjective construct and is explicitly concerned to encompass both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ aspects of place in his account (see The Betweenness of Place, 6-26 ), but he attempts to do this by an appeal to the concept of narrative that he takes to somehow occupy a position ‘between’ subjective and objective (see Entrikin, The Betweenness of Place, 132-134). In fact Entrikin appears to retain a view of place as an essentially ‘subjective’ structure.

In The Fate of Place Casey titles the chapter that deals with the Heideggerian appropriation of place ‘Proceeding to Place by Indirection’—see Casey, The Fate of Place, 284 and more generally 243-284.

See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H54; I also discuss this issue in my Heidegger’s Topology of Being, Chapter 3, in preparation.


For more on this point see my ‘Unity, Locality and Agency: Bilgrami on Belief and Meaning’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.

I attempt a more detailed account of this structure in Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography.


Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), ix. Elsewhere he writes that: ‘I am trying to conduct you on tours in a certain country. I will try to show that the philosophical difficulties which arise in mathematics as elsewhere arise because we find ourselves in a strange town and do not know our way about. So we must learn the topography by going from one place in the town to another, and from there to another, and so on. And one must do this so often that one knows one’s way, either immediately or pretty soon after looking around a bit, wherever one may be set down’ (Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, ed. Cora Diamond [Hassocks: Harvester, 1976], 44).