In the Brightness of Place: Out of History to Topology

Jeff Malpas

In the summer of 1936, the bright experience of the place [Ortschaft] where my thinking had to stand came to me. It is this place for which I suspected I was searching in Being and Time. It is thus that in this summer the Beiträge arrived – Heidegger, ‘Anmerkungen II’, Anmerkungen I–V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948). 1

1. For all the sound and fury that the publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks have provoked, it nevertheless remains unclear what genuinely new insights into Heidegger’s thinking the Notebooks themselves provide. This may seem a provocative claim, and yet it follows directly from the lack of attention, within much of the current debate, as to how the Notebooks should even be read. Are they to be viewed as indeed giving insight into the ‘inner’ workings of Heidegger’s life and thought? – and if so, then on what basis would such a reading be founded? Within what stylistic framing should the Notebooks be placed? – and is there only one such framing that is relevant (the Nietzschean Nachlass is an obvious model, and yet it seems not to be operative as such throughout the Notebooks in their entirety)? To what extent might some of the entries be intended ironically or sarcastically? To what extent might they be expressions more of a personal state of mind than of any considered philosophical views?

Few of these basic interpretive questions have arisen in the critical reception of the Notebooks so far. 2 For the most part, the assumption seems to have been that they can be read more or less ‘naively’, that is, without attention to any questions of interpretive methodology or approach, and even that they can be read in a way that prescinds from their historical situatedness – so that Heidegger is made to speak as if he were speaking now, and that his words had the same meaning and significance as
if they were uttered in a contemporary context. In any case, for many commentators the interest seems to have been less the direct import of the Notebooks for the understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy, than the use of the Notebooks to demonstrate Heidegger’s personal political culpability – his ‘crimes’ – in relation to Nazism and anti-Semitism, and for their philosophical relevance to be taken to follow from this. Here too, however, the real interpretive work required to make a genuine connection between any supposed personal culpability and its implications for Heidegger’s philosophy remains to be done in spite of the quantity of words that have been spent on the topic at issue.

It is likely to be some time before we arrive at a more sober and balanced assessment of Heidegger’s Notebooks as they relate to Heidegger’s philosophy. In the meantime, however, in the midst of the contemporary hubbub that surrounds the works, there are nevertheless some points that are emerging on which the Notebooks do appear to provide partial illumination – most especially, on the development of Heidegger’s critique of technology, on the thinking that surrounds the Contributions, and also, I would argue, on the shift to a more explicitly topological mode of thinking in the late 1940s, but which Heidegger himself connects with the thinking undertaken in the Contributions (although the topology that emerges in 1947 is itself distinct from that of the Contributions in very significant ways). It is on this latter point, the way the Notebooks shed light on Heidegger’s topology and the development of that topology, that I want to focus here. In doing so, my aim is to show the way the Notebooks reinforce the way in which place is at issue in Heidegger’s thinking, and especially the way his thinking shifts from the history to the topology of being. In this respect, my aim is to explore something of the place of the Notebooks within the place of Heidegger’s own thinking and so also in relation to the thinking of place.

2. Where one ends is often the same place as where one begins, and although this is not something that can be gleaned from the reading of the Notebooks alone (one
requires a much broader acquaintance with the Heideggerian corpus), Heidegger’s thinking does indeed have its end and its beginning in one and the same place, no matter whether we call it the Da, the Augenblick, the Lichtung, the Ereignis, or the Geviert, and regardless of whether we read the elaboration of this place as it occurs in Dreyfus, Sheehan, Capabianco or Figal. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, what unites many of Heidegger’s contemporary readers, in spite of their differences over terms or modes of analysis, is a peculiar inattention to or even avoidance of precisely this most obvious and straightforward of points, namely, that Heidegger’s thinking does indeed begin in this one place, and that this place is not a metaphorical origin, nor its appearance a mere accident of language, but an origin that refers us immediately to the character of Heidegger’s thinking, and even of all thinking, as indeed topological in character. Thinking is always placed, and the thinking that Heidegger enacts is not only a thinking that therefore begins in its place, but that also attempts to thematise its own being-placed, the being-placed, therefore, of all thinking and all presencing, and so too the very place of such thinking and such presencing.

That this place and being-placed, obvious though it is, is so often ignored, may be rendered less surprising when we reflect on the fact that not only does Heidegger come explicitly to recognise the topological character of his thinking relatively late, but at one point he himself seems to suggest that the seeming prominence of place, whether in his own thinking or elsewhere, is indeed a secondary phenomenon. In §70 of Being and Time, Heidegger writes that:

Dasein’s interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and through by ‘spatial representations’. This priority of the spatial in the Articulation of concepts and significations has its basis not in some specific power which space possesses, but in Dasein’s kind of Being. Temporality is essentially falling, and it loses itself in making present; not only does it understand itself circumspectively in terms of objects of concern which are ready-at-hand, but from those spatial relationships which making-present is constantly meeting in the ready-to-hand as
having presence, it takes its clues for Articulating that which has been understood and can be interpreted in the understanding in general.\(^5\)

The language Heidegger uses here is that of ‘space’ and ‘spatiality’ (Raum, Räumlichkeit) rather than explicitly of ‘place’ (whether in the form of Ort, Ortschaft, or Stätte), but it is a language that is all too readily taken, both by Heidegger’s readers, and perhaps, at least in Being and Time, even by Heidegger, to encompass place, as place is itself assumed to be something spatial.\(^6\) The claim that Heidegger makes in the above passage concerns the secondary character of space in relation to time, and the seeming priority of spatialised terms and concepts is presented as a consequence of temporality’s own constant tendency to understand itself in terms of the present, and so in terms of the merely present, that is, in terms of the spatial and so also, one might suppose, in terms connected with place.

The core claim at issue here – namely that “Dasein’s interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general... are dominated by spatial representations” – is not without precedent. It is, indeed, a claim presaged in Kant’s first Critique (where Kant notes that all representation, including the representation even of time, depends on spatiality\(^7\)). As Heidegger employs it, however, the claim figures as part of an argument for the secondary or derivative character of spatiality and the spatial as these in relation to temporality. Heidegger’s assertion is that the apparent primacy of spatial language is a consequence of Dasein’s tendency constantly to understand itself in terms that prioritise the merely ‘present’, and the fact that time itself is understood in this way is an inevitable consequence of this. Within the framework of Being and Time, however, it is temporality and the temporal that has ontological primacy, not spatiality, and so the seeming primacy of spatial representation has to be explained as itself a consequence of a mode of understanding that is itself a misunderstanding: the dominance of the spatial covers over the real character of Dasein’s being.
The argument that Heidegger attempts here, however, is made problematic by some of the same considerations on which it also depends. Heidegger’s argument aims at a separation of temporality from spatiality, since it aims at asserting the priority of one over the other, at the same time as it also relies upon the inextricability of each with the other – and not merely representationally, but ontologically also. It is precisely the inextricability of the spatial and the temporal that opens the possibility of treating spatiality as potentially able to be in some way ‘founded’ in temporality, and yet there in nothing in this inextricability as such that implies that it should support such a founding relation in one direction alone. Indeed, it seems no less questionable to suppose that one could remove all traces of the ‘spatial’ from the temporal than that one could remove all traces of the ‘temporal’ from the spatial. Heidegger privileges the move from the spatial as founded to the temporal as founding, but without offering any real argument to support that privileging. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that the argument he does offer depends for its plausibility on equivocating between two senses of spatiality – between what we might term ‘existential’ spatiality (which already brings with it a topological connotation) and Cartesian spatiality (which is the spatiality of the levelled-out world of unbounded ‘extension’, and within which place has no real place at all). In the latter sense, spatiality can indeed be viewed as a secondary notion, but it is secondary to existential spatiality no less than it is secondary to temporality (or at least to the mode of temporality – originary or ecstatic temporality – that is at issue for Heidegger).8

Although Heidegger never himself offers the sort of diagnosis of the difficulty that afflicts the attempt to assert the absolute primacy of temporality that I have set out above, Heidegger nevertheless comes to recognise that his attempt, in Being and Time, to assert the primacy of temporality is indeed mistaken – this is explicitly acknowledge, for instance, in the lectures on Kant from 1935.9 Moreover, it is not that Heidegger simply gives up on the idea of ‘deducing’ spatiality from temporality – he also comes effectively to abandon the idea that the dominance of the ‘spatial’, as
presented in *Being and Time*, necessarily involves a misunderstanding. Although Heidegger never makes this clear himself, the ‘spatial’ as it is employed in *Being and Time* is not, as I pointed out earlier, entirely separable from the topological. Cartesian spatiality aside, the spatiality that concerns Heidegger in *Being and Time* already includes that which pertains to *place* (the spatiality that Heidegger argues is secondary to temporality is indeed that of *existential* spatiality, namely, the spatiality associated with what, even in *Being and Time*, is called *Wohnen*\(^{10}\)). In this respect, Heidegger’s later insistence on the significance of the language of place (for instance, in his comments, in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, regarding the idea of language as the ‘house of being’ – an idea which also arises in direct connection to *Wohnen*\(^{11}\)), can be seen as something of a repudiation of his earlier denigration of the language of the ‘spatial’ (or at least of the ‘spatial’ as it operates topologically). Moreover, this rejection can be seen as already present in Heidegger’s refusal of any metaphorical reading of the language he employs – a language that is indeed frequently topological in character – in his readings of Hölderlin in the early 1940s.\(^{12}\)

3. The dominance of ‘spatial’ or better ‘topological’ language is indeed a feature of Heidegger’s thinking almost from beginning to end. Heidegger himself comments, in the *Notebooks*, on his use of ‘figurative’ (*bildlich*) language (which should not be assumed to be the same as a language of *metaphor*, but is rather a language of *image*\(^{13}\)), and that figurative language is itself a language that almost always involves spatial, bodily, and so also *topological* images. It is a style of language that is clearly evident in *Being and Time*, and it is for this very reason that Heidegger is forced there to offer an explanation of the seeming pre-eminence of such topological ways of speaking and understanding. In the *Notebooks*, the primacy of the topological appears most obviously in Heidegger’s constant invocation across many of the *Notebooks* from the mid-thirties, of the notion of *Da-sein*. The term is regularly hyphenated in the *Notebooks* from around 1932-33 onwards\(^{14}\), and the hyphenation draws attention precisely to the *Da* – to the there/here as it is in ordinary German.
This leaves open the question as how the *Da*, which is to say the there/here, is itself to be understood – the translation should not be assumed to have already done the philosophical work that is at issue in understanding the term. The *Da* can certainly be taken to stand in a close relation to the clearing – to the *Lichtung* – but this is not to say very much, and hardly offers much in the way of additional elucidation, doing little more than shifting the semantic focus. The relation between the there/here and the clearing is indeed already suggested by the idea of the clearing itself – the clearing can be said to be a clearing precisely though the way in which it is the opening of a there/here – and the there/here may also be said to be a there/here through the clearing that is established with it. The idea that one might thus give priority to the idea of the *Lichtung*, or even to other terms such as the *Ereignis*, over the *Da*, and that in doing so place is shown to be a secondary notion, itself depends on ignoring the topology that remains at work in the very terms, *Ereignis* no less than *Lichtung*, that are prioritised in this way.

In the *Notebooks* from 1934, ‘Überlegungen IV’, one finds Heidegger himself interrogating the idea of the *Da* – and specifically the *Da* as it stands in relation to world (a relation already invoked in an entry from the *Notebooks* from late 1931, ‘Winke X Überlegungen (II), und Anweisung’, in which Heidegger talks of the one task that “matters before everything and for everything”, namely, the opening up of “world-place” – *Welt-ortes*). “*Space!*”, he exclaims in an entry from ‘Überlegungen IV’ (from 1934), “‘Where’ is the there [*Da*], such that it is itself the ground of the where?” A few lines further down, Heidegger writes “*World … the vibrant middle of the there* [*Mitte des Da*] a grounded middle that *stands* in the clutches and joins of time”. Yet if the language of place is indeed evident in the *Notebooks* from relatively early on (not surprisingly given that this language does indeed develop out of the spatial and topological language of Heidegger’s earlier thinking), it is a language that receives even greater elaboration and salience in the *Contributions*. Echoing elements in the just-quoted passage from ‘Überlegungen IV’, Heidegger writes in the *Contributions* of *Da-sein* as “the axis in the turning of the event”. *Da-sein*, he says: “is
the between [das Zwischen]: between humans (as grounding of history) and the gods (in their history), and he adds that “the between [is] not one that simply results from the relation of the gods to humans; rather, one that first grounds the time-space [Zeit-raum] for such a relation”. The language that is at work here – the language of the between, of ‘relation’, of ‘turning’, and of time-space (which receives its first real articulation in Heidegger’s thinking in the Contributions) – is a language that might be said to evoke place in all but name (except, of course, for the prominence it already gives to the ‘there’).

The spatial and topological language that appears in the Contributions, beginning in 1936, first emerges, along with other key elements, in ‘Überlegung IV’ from 1934, and so in the period immediately after Heidegger’s resignation from the Rectorate (although it is also a development out of the earlier spatial and topological language that appears, if less explicitly formulated, in Being and Time). In the Contributions, however, this language is not only given greater elaboration, but it also seems to pervade the entire work. The very titles of the first four divisions of the Contributions – ‘The Prospect’, ‘The Resonating’, ‘The Interplay’, and ‘The Leap’ (the last three are ‘The Future Ones’, ‘The Last God’, and ‘Beyng’) – already indicate a certain sort of orientational setting, a certain sort of placing. Moreover, the overall structure of the Contributions in its entirety is one that Heidegger describes as “a preliminary sketch of the temporal-spatial playing field which the history of the transition first creates as its own realm …” These sorts of topological figures recur throughout the work, both in its overall plan and in the exploration and elaboration of the ideas that it aims to address. Thus, to take but one example, Heidegger’s discussion of the relation between beyng, the Ereignis and Da-sein proceeds in self-evidently topological terms:

Beings first arise historically out of the truth of being, and that truth is sheltered in the steadfastness of Da-sein…Here, out of Da-sein, the complete otherness of the relation to beyng is thought and carried out, and that happens in the time-space [Zeitraum] arising out
of the transporting and captivating of truth itself. Time-space itself is a conflictual domain of strife… Spacing which is temporalizing) – temporalizing (which is spatializing) (cf. the conflict of the strife) as the most proximate configuring domain for the truth of being, but not a relapse to the common, formal concepts of space and time (!), instead resumption into the strife, world and earth – event.  

Some of the most important sections in the Contributions concern Heidegger’s elaboration of the concepts evident in this passage – Da-sein, the truth of being, time-space – and almost always the elaboration of these concepts is undertaken, as in the passage above, in ways that are indeed topologically embedded. Time-space is itself named as the ‘abyssal ground’, as the “structure (joining) of the ‘there’, a structure of transport-captivation”, as “the site of the moment; the strife of world and earth”. One can open the Contributions almost anywhere and find topological allusions, images, and concepts. One might argue, in fact, that part of the problem with the Contributions is that its topology is so rampant as to make its character as a topology all the harder to grasp – the topological language that is used is too various, too differentiated, too intoxicated. Yet a topology it is – so much so that the very idea of the Ereignis seems to bring with it notions of place and placing.

It is no accident, therefore, that Heidegger can say both that Ereignis is the guiding word of his thinking from 1936 onwards, as he does in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ in 1946, and, in the Notebooks from around the same time, that it was in 1936 that he found the proper place (Ortschaft) of thinking for which he had been searching even in Being and Time and out of which the Contributions arrived – moreover, in spite of the “aberrations [Irrgänge] and attempts [Versuche]” that might seem to lead thinking away from this place, we are always turned back to it, “like a many-turning journey [Wanderschaft] within the same place [in der selben Ortschaft]”. Here it seems that Ortschaft and Ereignis are drawn together such that Joseph Fell can claim (as he did already in 1979) that “Heidegger’s terms ‘Event’ (Ereignis) and ‘Place’ (Ort) mean the same”, and even if this may be thought a little
too quick, it is also, especially in the light of what we can now see from the Notebooks, not far off the mark. Certainly the shift in Heidegger’s thinking to the Ereignis is also the shift to a more direct engagement with place (whether Ort or Ortschaft) – even though it takes Heidegger at least another ten years or so after 1936 to recognise that shift more explicitly for the topological shift that it is. In fact, it is notable that although Heidegger can talk, in the Notebooks in 1946, of the way in which the Contributions arises out of his finding of the proper place of thinking (Ortschaft des Denkens), and in entries from that same point onwards, he can talk of the place of the event (Ortschaft des Ereignisses) and the place of being (Ortschaft des Seyns) as well as the topology of being (Topologie des Seyns) – the Ereignis seemingly thought in terms of just such a topology – the Contributions does not name itself in that topological fashion and there is no mention in the Contributions of either topology of being or of the place of being.

4. The fact that the Contributions is not itself clear as to its own topological character is reflected in the fact that even, in the Contributions, for all that its language is so thoroughly topological, there is still no direct thematisation of place as such. Indeed, although Da-sein and the 'there' figure prominently, neither Ortschaft nor Ort have any salience in the Contributions, and the only term that does appear with any frequency that might be translated as place is Stätte, more commonly translated (as it is in the English translations of the Contributions) as ‘site’. Indeed, one might argue that for all that Heidegger has abandoned the attempt to deduce spatiality from temporality, a degree of primacy is still accorded to temporality purely inasmuch as the primary orientation of the Contributions, and of many of Heidegger’s works from the period of the mid to late ‘thirties and into the ‘forties, is that of a mode of being-historical (Seinsgeschichtliche or Seynsgeschichtliche) thinking – although part of the problem here, as in Being and Time, is Heidegger’s tendency to think time in ways that already treat it in implicitly topological terms (so that the topological is effectively incorporated into the temporal), coupled with the fact that, even in the
Contributions, place is still not directly taken up. The topology that is undoubtedly present in the Contributions thus not only does not name itself as a topology in that work, but it also understands itself in terms specifically of the history of being rather than the place of being.

Already, in the early 1930s, more especially in 1931-32, one can see Heidegger preoccupied with a form of the ‘history’ of being inasmuch as he sees the National Socialist ‘Revolution’ as potentially constituting a pivotal point in that history. Thus Heidegger writes in ‘Überlegungen und Winke III’, from 1932, for instance, of:

The incomparability of the world’s current hour, a chamber in which German philosophy should strike up and resound… The world-moment of our history: the resoluteness of that moment. We are not able, and do not want, to calculate the future or even to know what is to come. Quite to the contrary, we must and indeed want to create anew our futurity and thereby our entire temporality – the new courage.30

Heidegger seems to view philosophy, and so also thinking, so long as it is sufficiently courageous and properly oriented, as providing the basis for political action – as having the capacity to lead (zu führen) and to ordain a future:

The projection of being qua time overcomes everything hitherto as regards being and thinking; not idea, but mission; not loosing, but binding. The projection does not break loose to pure spirit but instead first opens and binds blood and soil to a preparedness for action and to a capacity for work and affectivity.31

Heidegger soon becomes disillusioned, however, and in 1934, and especially following his resignation from the Rectorate in April, his comments in the Notebooks start to take on a more critical tone. Whether the cause of his disillusionment is the Nazis’ own unwillingness to respond positively to Heidegger’s philosophical version of what National Socialism might be or his own seeing-through of the
pretensions of Nazi rhetoric to what lay beneath is irrelevant to the fact of that disillusionment, and to the disengagement from Nazism that accompanies it. The last of the entries in ‘Überlegungen und Winke III’ refers to ‘The Self-Assertion of the German University’ as “the little entr’acte of a great error” (though whether the ‘error’ here refers to Heidegger’s own political adventure or the wider political movement of which it was part is not made clear), and the entry goes on in pessimistic fashion to enumerate various forms of “disintegration” for which the ‘university’ serves as a mere ‘fig-leaf’. 32

With ‘Überlegungen IV’, which carries the sub-title, ‘Of Da-Sein and Being’, Heidegger’s comments seem to have moved almost entirely away from matters of politics. Any previous talk of putative new beginnings to which revolutionary politics might lay claim is replaced by the sense that Heidegger seems to attach to the idea of a ‘second’33 or ‘other’ beginning as a beginning for thinking (which, although clearly meant to apply to thinking as such, surely also carries something of the connotation of a second beginning for Heidegger himself). What occurs here is a shift away from a particular mode of being-historical thinking that, in its conviction of the capacity of philosophy to act politically, remained essentially subjectivist (despite any disavowals Heidegger’s himself might have made), and towards a new mode of being-historical (or being-historical) thinking that looks, not to philosophy’s capacity for action in history, but rather to the engagement of thinking with the primordial phenomenon of both the ‘there’ and history. Heidegger thus writes of “a questioning”:

… that pushes itself to its limits, where it experiences itself exposed to what is most question-worthy; where the ‘there’ opens up abyssally, where the need of preservational disputation necessitates the ‘there’ (constancy), and history, ie a people, becomes itself; history is the venturing of the gods out of a world and for a world…To question the concept of world disclosively = to coground thoughtfully the ‘there’ out of the affiliation to such history…”34
And a few entries further:

Philosophy – will not deliver us, will not discover new things (through research), will not (after the fact) raise any worldview to concepts – instead, philosophy will again know the πόλεμος – the event – and will fathom the ground and the abyss and the defomed ground and thus will become a plight and the necessity – to seize what has been given as task and to conquer what has been given as endowment – to bring history to a happening – to venture the gods once again.35

What is at issue is a mode of being historical-thinking that looks to the way thinking stands in relation to a more primordial occurrence that it neither determines nor directs, but which it can indeed bring to appearance – that looks to the way it stands in essential relation to the Ereignis, the event. The shift that occurs here is not only a shift away from a certain form of subjectivism (something evident, for instance, in Heidegger’s emphasis on the ‘abyssal’ nature of this thinking), but is also a shift away from philosophy as traditionally understood – and so towards a different kind of thinking – and this is just what emerges in 1936, not only privately in the Contributions, and presaged in the Notebooks, but publicly in the lectures on the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ (lectures that are first presented in 1935). In both the Contributions and ‘The Origin’, Heidegger begins to formulate a new mode of thinking – that is deeply indebted to art and to poetry and that looks to return thinking to its proper place.

Yet even though the thinking that crystalizes in 1936 can indeed be seen to represent a break with the thinking of 1933 and earlier (including, it should be added, with important elements of the thinking of Being and Time), and even though it does indeed aim to position itself as against any form of subjectivism, still that thinking takes the form, not of an eschewal of the being-historical, but rather its philosophical clarification and intensification – the thinking that is undertaken in the
Contributions is itself being-historical. Consequently, Heidegger writes that “the event of appropriation [Ereignis] is original history itself” and this is because “the essence of being no longer only means presence, but, rather, means the full essential occurrence of the temporal-spatial abyss and thus of truth”. It is as if Heidegger’s entanglement in that mode of politically-active being-historical thinking of the early ‘thirties demands of him that he rethink the very character of being as historical, and it is this that therefore drives much of the re-oriented thinking that makes up the Contributions.

In similar fashion, many of the concepts evident in the Notebooks and other writings from the early ‘thirties, concepts associated with ‘the people’ (das Volk) being notable examples, continue into the thinking of the Notebooks from 1934 onwards and into the Contributions, but these concepts are re-thought and re-conceptualised. On the idea of philosophy as ‘of’ a people, for instance, Heidegger writes, in the Contributions, that: “The expression ‘philosophy of a people’ immediately proves to be most ambiguous and obscure. Quite apart from the indeterminateness involved in talking of a ‘people’”, and yet he nevertheless also insists that “Meditation on what is proper to a people constitutes an essential passageway... The philosophy of a people is that which makes people people of a philosophy, grounds them historically in their Da-sein, and destines them to stewardship of the truth of being.”. The role of the ‘people’, and especially the German people, in Heidegger’s thinking during the ‘thirties and early ‘forties is a key element in the problematic character of the being-historical thinking that occurs in the Contributions and elsewhere. History is itself tied to a ‘people’, as is the truth of being, and so the event is also thought in these same terms.

In 1956, Heidegger comments, in regard to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, that: “the relationship of being to human being... is inadequately thought even in this presentation – a distressing difficulty that has been clear to me since Being and Time.”. This is not, however, a difficulty that affects only the understanding of the role of the artist or poet in relation to the artwork as a ‘setting to work of truth’
(which is the focus for Heidegger’s comment in 1956), but also the understanding of the role of a ‘people’ in relation to being and to thinking, and perhaps even the understanding of being in its relation to history. The place of thinking that opens up for Heidegger in 1936 is thus a place that still remains properly to be thought – which is, of course, why he can indeed refer to the “aberrations and attempts” that nevertheless accompany his wandering in that place.\textsuperscript{40} The shift that occurs in Heidegger’s thinking around 1936, radical though it is, does not, then, overcome all of the difficulties that were present in 1933. It is not just that Heidegger retains, for instance, a nationalist proclivity that is part of his personal ‘affectivity’ (Heidegger always remains, to a greater or lesser extent, a German nationalist, even after he has explicitly recognised the problematic character of nationalism), but that the very fact that his thinking in 1936 is so much driven by the need to re-think the terms of his thinking up to 1934, and especially of 1932-33, means that the philosophical thinking of the mid- to late ‘thirties remains partly entangled with a set of concepts that are, in themselves, problematic – no matter how they are rethought.

What first appears in the Notebooks in late 1934, and in the Contributions a little later, is a mode of topology that thinks place (or at least place in the guise of the ‘there’) being-historically – the place of being, even though that place is not yet named as such, is understood as the history of being. As such, the thinking that develops from 1934 onwards does not represent the abandonment of a concern with the relation between being and history, but instead turns more directly towards it and towards its philosophical re-conceptualisation. It is this more radical turns towards being-historical thinking in the mid- ‘thirties to early ‘forties that partly explains why the anti-Semitism that can be seen in the Notebooks (and it is perhaps significant that it appears \textit{only} in the Notebooks in any direct fashion) appears \textit{after} Heidegger’s break with Nazism. It was not sympathy with anti-Semitism that drew Heidegger to Hitler, but rather Heidegger’s projection onto National Socialism of his own revolutionary philosophical vision – a vision intimately tied to a conception of the world-historical role of Germany in philosophical and not only political terms.
Heidegger’s anti-Semitism belongs, therefore, with the more radical being-historical thinking that emerges in 1934-36, and is itself an artefact of what I would argue is Heidegger’s misconstrual of the topology of being in terms of the history of being (as well as his misconstrual of history as that which encompasses and is expressed through ‘peoples’ and their destinies). In this respect, Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, understood philosophically, is also part of his anti-Nazism. To see this, however, is also to see that the anti-Semitism and the anti-Nazism are both driven by the same mode of being-historical ‘topology’, and not the other way around. Moreover, as being-historical, the topology at issue here is already problematic as a topology, since it puts place, to some extent, under the sway of history, while at the same time leaves place itself only indirectly thematized.

5. One of the striking features of Heidegger’s thinking of the mid- to late ‘thirties and early ‘forties compared to that of the mid- to late ‘forties and after is the degree to which the history of being takes on a much more muted character in the later period – indeed, the history of being largely drops away just as the topology of being comes more explicitly to the fore, and as it drops away, so too does the language of a ‘people’ also disappear. In 1969, Heidegger is clear on the mistaken character of being-historical thinking, telling his audience at Le Thor that “Thinking Ereignis with the concepts of being and the history of being will not be successful; nor will it be with the assistance of the Greeks (which is precisely something ‘to go beyond’). With being, the ontological difference also vanishes....” The Notebooks suggest, however, that Heidegger’s negative assessment of the history of being is not peculiar to 1969 alone – in an entry from ‘Anmerkungen III’ (1946/47), he writes “In a lucid moment, I suddenly recognized that getting over being [Verwindung des Seyns], I had also given up philosophy and historiography [Historie]. But it still needed some time to understand that with this “history” [Geschichte] had been dropped too”. This is not to say that every form of the history of being disappears from Heidegger’s late topological thinking – there is still a history that belongs to the attempt to think the
place of being, but this history concerns only two elements: the different ways in which the thinking of the place of being has been thought; and the way that thinking, in its metaphysical tendency, is expressed in the rise of technological modernity and the current ‘plight’ of the world. The history at issue here, moreover, is not the history of a ‘people’, but the history of thinking – which as such provides the place for a thoughtful dialogue that reflects on the very place, of thinking and of being, that is essentially at issue. In the thinking of the mid- to late ‘forties and after, one might say that the idea of the ‘people’ has dropped away in favour simply of a new (or perhaps recuperated) thinking of the ‘human’ – a point especially evident in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’. The human, however, is now thought, not from the history of being (which is to say, not from ‘peoples’), but from the place of being – from topology.

It is precisely the latter that is, of course, the other striking feature of Heidegger’s thinking in the mid- to late ‘forties onwards is: the more explicitly topological character of that thinking. This is especially so in respect of the entries in the Notebooks from this period – most notably ‘Anmerkungen II’ onwards. One of the simplest ways of demonstrating this is simply by looking to the occurrences of the term Ortschaft in the Anmerkungen I-V compared to, for instance, the Contributions. As I noted above, neither Ortschaft nor Ort appear in any significant way in the Contributions – Ortschaft appearing not at all – and yet in the Anmerkungen I-V, Ortschaft appears over sixty times (almost all in II-IV). The fact that place is implicitly at issue in the Contributions and earlier, is evident in the centrality of the ‘there’, the Da, and yet so long as it is approached only or primarily in this way, it is all too readily interpretable by means of other concepts that easily obscure the topology at issue. With the appearance of Ortschaft as a key term, place is brought directly to the fore. Whilst Ortschaft is a key term in the Anmerkungen, Ort emerges as important in later essays, but whichever term is at issue, the same mode of topology seems to be at work. From the mid- to late forties onwards, Heidegger’s thinking can be understood as focussed on the attempt to delineate the place – topos, Ort, Ortschaft –
of being. It is thus that Heidegger can designate Ort, which he explicitly connects with topos, as the term that names the third and most important stage on the path of thinking.\textsuperscript{44}

In the thinking after 1946, it is clear that even the event has to be understood in close relation to place – whether Ortschaft or Ort – and it is significant that the Anmerkungen I-V contain many references to ‘the place of the event’ (Ortschaft der Ereignisses). The analysis of the event in terms of the Fourfold, das Geviert (which appears for the first time in the Bremen Lectures in 1949,\textsuperscript{45} but which is adumbrated in the Contributions\textsuperscript{46}, as it is also in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’), reinforces this point, since the fourfold is itself an articulation of the structure of place in the gathering of earth and sky, gods, and mortals in and through the thing. As gathering and appropriation, both the fourfold and the event belong essentially to the bounded opening that is place\textsuperscript{47} – to the ‘there’ as well as to the world. One might argue that Heidegger’s connecting of the event to the Es gibt (literally ‘it gives’)\textsuperscript{48} can in turn be connected to the ‘given-ness’ that belongs to place and to the way place itself ‘gives’ place. It is not insignificant that the German phrase is normally translated into English by a phrase that calls upon the ‘there’ – Es gibt becomes ‘there is’. So often regarded as inadequate, the translation can, in this sense, be seen as actually offering a deeper level of illumination. One might even say that the connection between the Es gibt and place is already suggested by the Greek understanding of place that is evident in the idea, not merely of topos, but also of chora. The chora is indeed that which supports and sustains, that which allows for appearance by offering its own withdrawal, that which sets free both space and time so as to allow for the lingering of presence.\textsuperscript{49}

The dropping away of the emphasis on the history of being and the more topological orientation both appear in Heidegger’s post-war thinking along with a more meditative or contemplative stance – one that is often taken to imply a form of ‘quietism’. Certainly, there is a clear difference in tone as well as language between the writing that appears in the Contributions and the Notebooks of the ‘thirties and
early ‘forties and the writings of the late ‘forties onwards. Daniela Valega-Neu writes of the way in which Heidegger’s writing in in the Notebooks of the ‘thirties is pervaded by ‘struggle’ (Kampf), “a word”, she says, “that abounds in all of Heidegger’s Notebooks”, and she adds that “there are clear indications that for him this struggle is akin to the Heraclitean polemos”. Along with struggle is an emphasis on endurance, resistance, and refusal, and a style that is declamatory, even, in the Old Testament sense, ‘prophetic’ (perhaps even more so than it is ‘poetic’).

In contrast, by the late ‘forties, Heidegger’s thinking has shed almost all of this, and instead takes on a calmer and more questioning tone (even though it remains pessimistic about modernity); rather than a decisive saying, the thinking of the post-war period has the character of an attentive responding – even, as Heidegger sometimes emphasises, a listening – which is indeed why it is rightly perceived as having a more meditative or contemplative character.

Once again, as with the shift in his thinking that occurs in 1934-36, one might say that this is the outcome of a set of situational factors – the end of the War, Germany’s defeat, and Heidegger’s own loss of the right to teach and his subsequent breakdown – but this does ought not to take away from the fact that what is at issue is a philosophical shift that can also be seen as underpinned by a set of philosophical considerations. The shift from the history of being to a more direct engagement with the topology of being brings with it a different philosophical comportment that can itself be understood as the compartment that comes from a sense of attentiveness to place, a sense of attentiveness that is also tied to a proper responsiveness. This, it might be said, is what Heidegger eventually comes to call Gelassenheit – releasement – and which is not to be understood quietistically, but rather as a different mode of engagement. It is as if, in 1936, when Heidegger first finds that ‘place of thinking’ for which he was searching, he is nevertheless not yet able to orient himself in and to that place. It is not until 1946 that he can identify the place at issue as the place it is, and only then can his thinking find its proper orientation in that place – and only then can it speak in a more considered and genuinely reflective fashion.
6. As one of the two epigrams to ‘Art and Space’ (the other is from Lichtenburg), Heidegger takes a line from Aristotle’s *Physics* IV: “It appears however to be something overwhelming and hard to grasp, the *topos*” – though Heidegger adds, as a gloss on *topos*, “that is, place-space [*Ort-Raum*]”. That he does not translate *topos* only as place is indicative both of the fact that the Greek term does not yet involve a differentiation between the two (something is also true of the French *espace*), and that Heidegger’s own interest is in the way space [*Raum*] belongs with place [*Ort*]. Nevertheless, the fact that both space and place may be taken to be at issue in *topos* in no way takes away from the essentially topological character of the inquiry that follows after Heidegger’s quoting of this line. In drawing attention to the difficulty of the thinking at issue here, Heidegger draws attention to a difficulty that is not only evident in the history of philosophy, but also to a difficulty evident (and surely experienced) in his own thought. Even though the idea of place seems indeed to be there in Heidegger’s thinking from the beginning, the difficulty that it presents means that Heidegger has to find his way back to place, and even when he seems to have returned there, even then place remains obscure and obscured, even then Heidegger’s thinking still has a tendency to wander in “in aberration and attempt”.

One might say that some of the difficulty for the thinking of place that Heidegger attempts derives from the fact that German has no single term that serves to refer to place in the sort of encompassing way that is true of the English ‘place’ – the latter term being one that seems to capture the idea of both openness and bound without bringing any more specific or technical meaning with it. Both *Ortschaft* and *Ort*, while they share some of the sense that belongs with ‘place’, also tend to have more specific connotations. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that it takes Heidegger some time to come to understand his thinking as a topology – German has, one might say, too differentiated a vocabulary when it comes to place: *Ortschaft*, *Ort*, *Statte*, *Platz*, *Gegend*, *Bereich*, as well as a range of related terms on which Heidgger draws
such as Da, Zwischen, Offene. Yet English offers only a partial advantage here, and perhaps no real advantage overall, since the very breadth of the English ‘place’ also means that it is a term all too readily seen as vague, as lacking in real content, as in need of reduction to the more specific notions of ‘space’ and especially of ‘physical space’ (which is what most often occurs in English-language discussions of place).

The truth is that every attempt to address place must arise out of and contend with its own place – and that must include the very place that is given in language. Whether we speak, Greek, German, or English, the task of addressing place will always be difficult – as it is always difficult to turn back to that in which we always already are. Moreover, this reflects a more general feature of thinking: namely, that it is opened up to that which is to be thought only through its own being placed, which also means, its own boundedness – even, one might say, its own delimitation.

It is because the possibilities of thinking arise out of the bounds of thinking that those possibilities always include the possibility of failure – even that those possibilities must inevitably lead to failure of one sort or another. Heidegger’s thinking, as the development of that thinking through the Notebooks shows, is no less affected by its place, and so by the bounds and limits that belong to it, than any other thinking, and neither is it any less prone to failure. Thus, in Heidegger’s case, one sees both the possibilities for thinking, but also its failure as one such possibility (a failure that may be more or less problematic), in 1927, in 1933, in 1936, and even in 1946. Although it is the boundedness of thinking that makes thinking possible, the failures that are inevitable in thinking are never such as to completely determine that thinking – at least not if that thinking is indeed thoughtful (if it is indeed thinking). Consequently, one does not read a thinker only though their failures, but rather in spite of them, and what matters is not whether a thinker fails, but whether their thinking remains captured by that failure or moves beyond it. Whatever we might say about Heidegger’s ability to face up to his personal and philosophical failures publicly, to acknowledge or even to apologies for them, the evidence of the Notebooks, and of the course of his thinking over his already published work,
demonstrates that he was not captured by those failures, but retained the capacity to think and re-think. It is thus the passage of Heidegger’s thinking – the path or way along which it moves and the direction of that path – that matters more than any one stage that might be part of it. This is, of course, true of place: it is to be seen, not in any one aspect or picture, but rather in the movements and directions that are possible both within and from it. Perhaps we should say that part of the real significance of the Notebooks is in showing the place of Heidegger’s thinking in just this sense – in showing the movements and directions that belong to that place – and in bringing that very place to the fore.

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1 Gesamtausgabe 97 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2015), p.191 [§125].

2 Although, Ingo Farin and I have attempted to raise some of them in Farin and Malpas (eds), Reading Heidegger’s Black Notebooks (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2016).

3 My own view is that the Notebooks do not provide much that is new, but rather tend to corroborate ideas or to reinforce what is evident from existing sources (even the evidence the Notebooks supply regarding the shift to a more explicit focus on place largely reinforces what is evident from existing sources). Although the anti-Semitic remarks that the Notebooks contain are indeed not replicated elsewhere in Heidegger’s works as we currently know them, they do not seem to me to be substantive enough to warrant the claim that they must significantly change the character of our reading of Heidegger. In this regard, I am not persuaded by the arguments, at least insofar as they relate to the Notebooks, of such as Peter Trawny or Donattella di Cesare. Some of Heidegger’s remarks do reinforce the indications that we already have, notably from his letter to Marcuse, that Heidegger was unable to acknowledge the full horror and significance of the Holocaust (a point to which
Ingo Farin draws attention), just as they also reinforce the fact of Heidegger’s Germano-centrism, but again this does not tell us much that is genuinely new.


6 In fact, in Being and Time, Heidegger simply seems not to have recognised the importance of either the connection between space and place or the distinction between them.


8 Cartesian spatiality has its own ‘temporalized’ analogue in the levelled-out time of the everyday – the temporality of mere succession. Such ‘everyday time’ can itself be seen as a mode of spatialized time – and as actually prone to being reduced to a mode of spatiality (as time so often is within the frame of modernity).


10 See Being and Time, H54.


The hyphenated form does occur in *Being and Time*, but only in a few specific instances, and the unhyphenated form is the one Heidegger standardly employs. F. W. von Herrmann claims that the shift to the hyphenated form as dominant first occurs in the *Contributions* – see von Herrmann, ‘Dasein and Da-Sein in *Being and Time* and in *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*’, in F. Schalow (ed) *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), esp. pp.216-217 (pp. 213-224), and if the *Notebooks* are set to one side, then von Herrmann’s claim is correct.


*Contributions to Philosophy*, pp.7-8.

*Contributions to Philosophy*, p.205

*Contributions to Philosophy*, p.293


‘Letter on “Humanism”’, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.241, n.b. In another note at the very beginning of the ‘Letter’ Heidegger writes: “What is said here was not first thought up when this letter was written, but is based on the course taken by a path that was begun in 1936, in the ‘moment’ of an attempt to say the truth of being in a simple manner”’, ‘Letter’, p.239, n.a.


Heidegger, ‘Anmerkungen II’, p.191
27 See eg. ‘Anmerkungen II’, p.201-202; see also ‘Anmerkungen V, p.434 (Topologie der Ortschaft des SeynsX), and ‘Anmerkungen V, p.512 (Topologie des SeynsX).
28 Ort appears in the Contributions at several places, but never in a way that makes place itself central – see Beiträge zur Philosophie, ed. F.W. von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe 65 (Frankfurt: Kolstermann, 1989), pp.18, 60, 156, 187, 207, 261, 329, 330, 358. Ortschaft seems not to occur at all.
29 See Beiträge, pp.5, 8, 24, 26, 90, 95-98, 155, 228, 234, 237, 238, 242, 243, 255, 260, 277, 285, 322, 384, 397, 407, 412, 413, 417, 486. As with the few appearances of Ort, the appearances of Stätte are not such as to thematize place in any direct or explicit way.
30 ‘Überlegungen und Winke III’, p.109 & 112 (‘Ponderings and Intimations III’, pp.80 & 82). Heidegger proclaims that it is the Führer, Adolf Hitler, who has “awakened a new actuality; giving our thinking a new course and impetus. Otherwise, despite all the thoroughness, it would have remained lost in itself and would only with difficulty have found its way to effectiveness. Literary existence is at an end”, ‘Überlegungen und Winke III’, p.111 (‘Ponderings and Intimations III’, p.91).
32 ‘Überlegungen und Winke III’, pp.198-199 (‘Ponderings and Intimations III’, p.145-146). Heidegger always maintained a commitment to the value and significance of what the Rectoral Address attempted. Significantly, at the time it was given, the Address also had the strong support of Karl Jaspers – see the discussion in Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.86-87.
Contributions, pp.27-28.

Contributions, p.35


‘Anmerkungen II’, p.191 – see above n.23.


‘Anmerkungen III’, pp. 222/23. See also ‘Anmerkungen V’, 500. Against this background, one of Heidegger’s comments towards the end of ‘Anaximander’s Saying’, from 1946, takes on an additional significance. Commenting on the ‘confusion’ that reigns regarding being, Heidegger writes: “Theories of nature, doctrines about history, do not remove the confusion. They further confuse things until they are unrecognizable…”, ‘Anaximander’s Saying’, *Off the Beaten Track*, p.281.


‘With *Being and Time*… the ‘question of Being’ …concerns the question of being qua being. It becomes thematic in *Being and Time* under the name of ‘the question of the meaning [Sinn] of being’. Later this formulation was given up in favor of that of ‘the question of the truth of Being,’ , and finally in favor of that of ‘the question concerning the place or location of Being’ [‘*Ortschaft des Seins*’], from which the name topology of being arose [*Topologie des Seins*]. Three terms which succeed one another and at the same time indicate three steps along the way of thinking: MEANING – TRUTH – PLACE (*topos*). ‘Seminar in Le Thor 1969’, *Four Seminars*, p.47; see Seminare
For instance, ‘The Thing’, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.180: “The fouring, the unity of the four, presences as the appropriating [ereignende] mirror-play of the betrothed, each to the other in simple oneness. The fouring presences as the worlding of world. The mirror-play of world is the round dance of appropriating [Ereignens].”

See Contributions, p.246.

See Heidegger’s Topology, pp.


On chora and place, see my response to Peter Grattan’s attempt to set chora against place (or at least against place as topos) in ‘Five theses on place (and some associated remarks): a reply to Peter Gratton’, Il Cannocchiale, forthcoming.


This is evident in any number of works from the late ‘forties on, but is especially notable in What is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), first published in 1954, particularly with its emphasis on thinking (Denken) as thanking (Danken).

The translation here is of Heidegger’s German version of the line, ‘Die Kunst und Der Raum’, p.203.

‘Die Kunst und Der Raum’, p.203.

See the discussion of this in my Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.21-22.
I would like to thank Ingo Farin for many conversations over recent years – especially in relation to Heidegger and most recently, the *Black Notebooks* – that have fed directly into the ideas set out above.